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WOMEN DIRECTORS ON PUBLIC COMPANY BOARDS: DOES A CRITICAL MASS AFFECT
LEVERAGE?
Cindy K. Harris, Ursinus College
ABSTRACT
This study examines the relationship between corporate leverage (the ratio of total debt to total assets) and gender
diversity on US public company boards, with particular focus on boards that have at least 25% women directors.
Using this critical mass of women eliminates from consideration boards with lesser female representation, whose
female directors may be marginalized in their contributions to board functioning and decision-making. I
hypothesize that when boards have this minimum threshold of gender diversity, the influence of risk-averse female
directors will impact board decisions related to financing, resulting in lower debt ratios when compared to boards
with no female directors. Drawn from the listing of firms compiled annually by Catalyst, the sample is comprised of
Fortune 500 firms with no women on their board and firms with at least 25% women directors on their board,
respectively, for the two year period 2012 and 2013. Using a total sample of 78 firms, and controlling for
determinants of capital structure and board governance variables, I find a significant negative relationship between
boards with at least 25% women directors and corporate leverage. Further, the presence of at least 25% women on
the board has a significant moderating effect on the association between both board size and board age, and
corporate leverage, leading to an even stronger negative relationship. The evidence suggests that substantial board
gender diversity is a corporate governance factor that can influence firm outcomes, and adds insight into the factors
that can affect corporate financing choices of US public companies.

INTRODUCTION
The role of the board of directors is to protect shareholders’ interests by insuring that management is accountable for
their decisions and actions. Boards act to reduce or eliminate the principal-agent problem through a variety of
mechanisms and processes collectively described as corporate governance – they add value through advising the
executive officers and monitoring management’s actions. Certainly, “the idea that experienced board members act as
valuable monitors and advisors for CEOs and that firms seek directors who have particular backgrounds to
maximize shareholder wealth” is a key component of corporate governance (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012).
Research on how boards function, make decisions and the effects of their monitoring role have long focused on
board composition. As the number of women on corporate boards of directors has slowly grown, an emerging area
of corporate governance research is examining how gender diversity of corporate boards influences board
functioning and firm outcomes. Recent academic studies have chiefly focused on establishing the linkages between
female representation on boards and aspects of corporate performance, including profitability, growth and
shareholder value. The results have been inconsistent. Some have found no significant link between board diversity
and firm performance, using two measures of profitability, Tobin’s Q and return on assets (Adams & Ferreira,
2009) (Rose, 2007). Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson (2010) observe a significant positive relationship
between the number of women on all of the major board committees and return on assets (“ROA”.)
In studies that examine the link between gender diversity of the board and firm performance, gender diversity is
measured in a variety of ways. Researchers have used count data (number of female directors) (Carter, D'Souza,
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010), at least one female on the board (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) as well as a continuous
measure of the percentage of women on the board (Rose, 2007) to test the relationship between the presence of
female directors and a variety of financial performance outcomes. However, the sample data used in these studies
was comprised of relatively low representation of female directors on boards. In 1996, women held only 10.2% of
Fortune 500 board seats while 10 years later in 2005 that figure grew to just 14.7% (Catalyst). Consequently,
researchers have faced difficulty in isolating the impact of a single female director, or a very small group of female
directors, on corporate performance (Bilimoria, 2006).
Internationally, there is increased movement toward boardroom gender quotas. Being the first, in 2003 Norway
passed a quota mandating 40% female directors effective in 2008. Countries that followed include Spain, Iceland
and France with a 40% quota, and Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands with lower percentage quotas of 30-33%
(Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). Malaysia has imposed a 30% quota for new appointments to boards

(http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/economist-explains-14, 2014), while Germany is
implementing a requirement of 30% of their non-executive board seats be held by women in 2016
(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-introduce-legal-quota-for-women-in-boardrooms8947277.html, 2013). Further, the European Commission is considering imposing quotas. While no such
groundbreaking policy exists in the United States, there is a national campaign by the organization 2020 Women on
Boards urging the goal to increase the percentage of women on U.S. company boards to 20% or greater by the year
2020. (http://www.2020wob.com/)
Further, although there are a growing number of research papers that examine gender diversity in relation to firm
performance, there are few studies that examine the link between the presence of female board directors on
corporate boards and the relative amount of debt financing, and these studies do not specifically focus on US firms.
There is some research that considers the link between female directors and insolvency risk as well as the
composition of debt. Wilson and Altanlar examine insolvency risk in their study of UK private companies using
2007-2008 data, and find that having a higher ratio of female directors is associated with lower insolvency risk
(Wilson & Altanlar, 2009). In a study of firms across 33 countries (in which the US represented 22% of the sample)
using 2006-2010 data, Alves examines the relationship between board of director composition and firm financing
mix. Findings noted that when the board chair is not an executive, there is “some evidence that a more gender
diverse board of directors is associated with more long term financing” (Alves, Couto, & Francisco, 2014).
In their study of mandated female representation on boards in Norway from 2001 to 2009, Ahern and Dittmar
observed that the effect of the legislated 40% gender quota led firms to increase in size, undertake more acquisitions,
increase leverage (defined as total liabilities divided by total assets), and decline in operating performance. Since
“boards of directors are likely to be involved with acquisition decisions and major changes to financial policies, and
because boards became younger and less experienced” after the quota took effect, they assert that the increased
participation of female directors on boards weakened board monitoring and advising. In addition, Ahern and Dittmar
suggest the observed financial effects may be the result of male directors changing their behavior in response to the
presence of more female board members. (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012)
This research study addresses two research gaps in the literature. First, focusing on board gender diversity, it utilizes
a critical threshold of female directors, expressed as 25% or more of the board, which may affect the dynamics of
the board, thereby exerting a strong influence on corporate governance and in turn, firm outcomes. Rather than the
mere presence of a female on the board, or a count of female directors, using this critical mass of women on the
board “puts a higher standard of compositional diversity” on the board and avoids the likelihood of “gender-based
token dynamics” (Bilimoria, 2006). Second, focusing only on US firms, the study considers the link between this
critical percentage of female board directors (board diversity) and corporate leverage using Fortune 500 firms,
providing new insight into a governance factor which may be an additional determinant of capital structure in the
US.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the literature related to the effect of board diversity on corporate
governance and firm outcomes is discussed, including gender differences in behavior, decision making and risk
taking. Literature addressing capital structure theory follows. In section 3 the main hypothesis is presented. The
sample data and model are presented in section 4, and section 5 presents the empirical results, analysis and
discussion. Section 6 and 7 outline the conclusions drawn from the study and its limitations, respectively.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Effect of Board Diversity on Corporate Governance and Firm Outcomes
Gender differences in behavior have been observed in aspects of corporate governance. In a study over the period
1996-2003, comparing S&P firms with at least one female director to those without, Adams & Ferreira observed that
women appear to behave differently – they attend a higher percentage of committee and board meetings than their
male counterparts, and the greater the fraction of women on the board, the better is attendance behavior of male
directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Not only may women impact the behavior of their male peers on the board, but
also “female directors could more closely correspond to the concept of the independent director emphasized in
theory” since “they do not belong to the ‘old boys club’” (Adams & Ferreira, 2009).

Are women the new ‘independent’ directors? When a director is independent, the director has no material
relationship with the company, as a partner, shareholder or officer of an entity that has a relationship with the
company (i.e. its subsidiary). The importance of independence is that it ensures the director has no business
interests that could otherwise interfere with exercising objective judgment in their oversight role. In research prior
to the minimum requirements for independence, the degree to which boards were comprised of independent
directors was a corporate governance variable included in studies to gauge board effectiveness and oversight.
However, since 2002, US publicly traded firms are required to have a majority of independent directors on its board.
Given the slow but steady growth of women on corporate boards, it may be that the presence of female directors
now plays a comparable role influencing the quality of board monitoring and decision-making that independent
board directors previously played, when independence was not a mandate. In short, “gender diverse boards may be a
better monitor of managers because women directors are more independent” than male directors (Simpson, Carter,
& D'Souza, 2010). Since other researchers conclude that more independent boards tend to hold more debt (Alves,
Couto, & Francisco, 2014), if female directors are viewed as the new proxy for independence, then one might expect
firms with more women on their boards to have higher debt ratios.
However, prior literature suggests that women are more conservative and risk averse than men, and exhibit less risky
behavior in financial decisions. Psychological research demonstrates that, in areas such as finance, men are more
overconfident than women. They tend to overestimate the precision of their knowledge regarding the value of a
financial security and “hold unrealistic beliefs about how high their returns will be and how precisely these can be
estimated” (Barber & Odean, 2001). In Barber and Odean’s study conducted for the period 1991-1997, they observe
that men traded stock investments 45% more frequently than women, and realized lower net returns from excessive
trading than women, especially among single men. In a similar vein, empirical evidence from a study by Huang
using executive data (CEO and CFO) from 1993-2005 reveals that male executives exhibit relative overconfidence
in significant corporate decision making compared with women. In particular male executives undertake more
acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives. (Huang & Kisgen, 2013)
Relevant corporate governance research further supports the effects of gender differences on firm outcomes related
to debt. Research by Palvia et al (2013) find that female CEOs and board chairs in US banks assess risk more
conservatively and hold higher levels of equity capital and reduce default risk during periods of market stress. They
observe that “female executives and directors are less overconfident in their risk assessments and may inherently
promote more conservative business strategies that reduce bank default risk” (Palvia, Vahamaa, & Vahamaa).
Wilson (2009) finds that the ratio of female directors on boards is associated with a lower risk of insolvency in
private companies, “providing support to the concept that women are more risk-aware or risk-averse and can add
value to the management and decision-making capability of the company.”
Capital Structure Theories
Capital structure, or leverage, refers to the degree to which firms finance through borrowing or debt rather than
through the issuance of stock to support operating and investing activity and increase profitability. Two fundamental
theories exist in the corporate finance literature, which explain the factors influencing leverage. These are the tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory. These theories can predict different management behaviors in relation to
financing choices, particularly in relation to the effect of board of directors’ composition on those choices (Alves,
Couto, & Francisco, 2014)
The trade-off theory suggests that firm’s evaluate the costs and benefits of each source of financing, debt versus
equity, in deciding how much of each to utilize. In short, firms seek an optimal balance of debt while considering the
positive effects of the debt tax shield (savings from deductibility of interest payments to debt holders) as well as its
costs in the form of bankruptcy risk or financial distress (Alkhatib, 2012). However, debt holders are not able to
exercise control on the use of funds they provide, since managers may act in their own interests or in the interests of
stockholders, thereby potentially increasing the riskiness of the firm’s asset investments. Thus, effective corporate
governance is essential to insure that management acts as an agent for company shareholders when selecting and
maintain an appropriate balance of financing.
Unlike the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory does not predict firms seek a target leverage ratio. Instead, the
theory relates to the preferred order in which firms seek funding sources. Firms favor internal funding (retained
earnings) to external sources; within external sources, firms seek debt financing before equity financing, due to the

relatively cheaper cost of financing through debt. Further, within debt, firms prefer short-term debt over long-term
debt (Myers, 1984). The order of preference stems from information asymmetries between managers and outside
investors (Alves, Couto, & Francisco, 2014). Use of internal financing allows managers to pursue new investment
opportunities without the repercussions of external financing.
Under the pecking order theory, short-term debt and long-term debt financing are ranked second and third,
respectively, while financing through internal and external equity sources are ranked first and last, respectively. This
paper is examining the effect of board gender diversity on corporate leverage, defined as the sum of short-term and
long-term debt divided by total assets. Since ranking is not relevant to the analysis, the paper relies on the trade-off
theory of capital structure. Given the research findings of the observed differences between decision-making and
risk preference of women versus men, female directors may influence how firms assess the optimal balance of debt
and equity financing. Models of capital structure that focus on firm characteristics alone miss this important factor
for explaining differences in firm behavior. (Huang & Kisgen, 2013)
HYPOTHESES
This research study considers the impact of gender diversity on US corporate board functioning through substantial
female director representation, and examines its effect on the corporate leverage (the sum of short-term and longterm debt divided by total assets). In particular, I expect boards with a critical mass of female directors - at least 25%
- to be associated with a lower amount of leverage than corporate boards with no female directors. Given females’
differences in behavior as well as predilection to assume less risk, corporate boards with greater gender diversity
will seek to avoid the potential bankruptcy costs and financial distress associated with debt financing and pursue
alternative sources of funding. As such, relying on the trade-off theory of capital structure, companies with gender
diverse boards are expected to have a lower optimal balance of debt financing relative to total assets. In addition, it
is expected that the presence of this critical mass of women on the board will interact with other corporate
governance variables, impacting their influence on corporate leverage. Specifically, the presence of at least 25%
female directors on the board is expected to moderate the association between both average board age and average
board size and corporate leverage, resulting in a lower debt ratio.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a gender diverse corporate board of directors, measured as at least 25% female
directors on the board, is negatively associated with the corporate leverage (the debt-to-asset ratio.)
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a gender diverse corporate board of directors, measured as at least 25% female
directors on the board, decreases the association between both board age and board size on corporate leverage
(the debt-to-asset ratio.)
SAMPLE DATA AND MODEL
Sample Data
This study builds on a sample of firms drawn from two census lists compiled annually by Catalyst: Fortune 500
companies with zero women directors and Fortune 500 companies with 25% or more women directors.
(http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2012-catalyst-census-fortune-500-women-board-directors)
(http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2013-catalyst-census-fortune-500-women-board-directors).
The sample is
comprised of firms that are on each Catalyst list in both 2012 and 2013 and for which financial and corporate
governance data is available for both years. Industry SIC codes, financial statement data, and financial ratios were
obtained from the Mergent Online database (“Mergent”). Corporate governance data was found in the firm’s annual
proxy filings and annual reports.
Financial firms (with SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded from the sample because they are subject to specific
capital requirement regulations that can potentially influence their financing choices (Alves, Couto, & Francisco,
2014). The initial sample of non-financial firms results in 110 companies. Other exclusions include firms whose
corporate structure changed in 2013 (mergers, spinoffs), firms not subject to standard corporate reporting
requirements (REIT, limited partnerships), firms with abnormal debt ratios (near or exceeding 100% and with
negative stockholders’ equity), and firms for which information was unavailable. Table 1 summarizes the
construction of the final sample of 78 Fortune 500 firms, which includes 23 companies with zero women directors

(“all- male” boards) in both years (2012 and 2013), and 55 companies with at least 25% women directors (“diverse”
boards) in both years.
TABLE 1: CONSTRUCTION OF SAMPLE

Firms listed on Catalyst Census in 2012 and 2013
Financial firms
Corporate change (spinoff, merger)
Non-corporate structure (partnership, REIT)
No Proxy filing
Long-term debt ratios near or exceeding 100%
Other
Sample total

Firms with ≥25%
Women Directors
“Diverse Boards”
68
9
3
1
0
0
0
55

Firms with Zero
Women Directors
“All Male Boards”
42
4
4
5
2
2
2
23

Total
Sample
110
13
7
6
2
2
2
78

Table 2 summarizes the industry breakdown by each subgroup and for the total sample. In both subgroups as well as
the total sample, the majority of firms are in the manufacturing sector. While firms with diverse boards are least
represented in mining and construction, their second largest concentration is in wholesale and retail trade. Firms
with all-male boards also have their second largest concentrations are in wholesale and retail trade as well as
transportation, communication and utilities, but in contrast, are least represented in the services category.
TABLE 2: INDUSTRY BREAKDOWN BY SUBGROUP AND SAMPLE
Firms with ≥25%
Firms with Zero
SIC code (Industry)
Women Directors
Women Directors
Total Sample
“Diverse Boards”
“All Male Boards”
count
%
Count
%
Count
%
1000-1999 (Mining, Construction)
2
4%
3
13%
5
6%
2000-3999 (Manufacturing)
28
51%
10
44%
38
49%
4000-4999 (Transportation,
6
11%
4
17%
10
13%
Communication, Utilities)
5000-5999
12
22%
4
17%
16
21%
(Wholesale, Retail Trade)
7000-8999 (Services)
7
13%
2
9%
9
11%
Total
55
100%
23
100%
78
100%
Table 3 reports the average number of female directors in firms with diverse boards by industry sector for the twoyear period 2012 and 2013. In both years, every industry has at least 3 women on their board and the highest average
representation of women is in the manufacturing and transportation sector.
AVERAGE NUMBER OF WOMEN DIRECTORS BY INDUSTRY IN “DIVERSE BOARDS”
(FIRMS WITH ≥ 25% WOMEN DIRECTORS)
SIC code (Industry)
2012
2013
1000-1999 (Mining, Construction)
3.00
3.00
2000-3999 (Manufacturing)
3.57
3.57
4000-4999 (Transportation, Communication, Utilities)
3.83
3.50
5000-5999 (Wholesale, Retail Trade)
3.25
3.33
7000-8999 (Services)
3.43
3.43
TABLE 3:

Model and Dependent Variable
The regression model used in this paper is as follows:
DebtAsset13 =

B0 + B1FemaleDir12 + B2Board characteristics (BDSize12, BDAge12, CDual12) +

B3Determinants of Debt Financing (Risk (LogRev12), Growth (TAGrowth), Profitability (ROA12),
Asset Tangibility (PPEtoTA12), Non-debt Tax Shield (TaxShield12) +
B4 Industry + FemaleDir12*BDSize + FemaleDir12*BDAge12
The debt to asset ratio (DebtAsset13) is measured as the book value of total debt divided by total assets as reported
by Mergent for the fiscal year end 2013. Total debt is the sum of reported short-term and long-term debt, but does
not include current liabilities, so as to account for only interest-bearing debt. The independent variables are
measured for the fiscal year 2012. The one-year lag is used to reflect that the characteristics of the board and its
composition influence decisions that may have an impact in a subsequent period. Likewise, financing decisions are
made based on earlier measures of a firm’s financial position.
Independent variable: Critical Mass of Female Directors
This paper hypothesizes that the gender diversity of a company’s board of directors affects the board’s selection of
corporate financing as measured by the debt-to-asset ratio. Board diversity is measured using a dummy variable to
capture a critical threshold of female directors (i.e. at least 25% female directors) in order to measure the effect of
substantial female representation on the board.
In firms where there is only one woman on the board, she may be perceived as a token, having no substantive impact
on financial outcomes (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). Findings from prior studies examining the impact of board
gender diversity on board governance and firm financial outcomes were limited by the lower levels of female board
representation, which led to mixed findings of the impact of female directors on the board. To improve investigating
the impact of board gender diversity, Simpson, Carter, and D’Souza (2010) assert that “a threshold or critical mass
of women on the board or a dummy variable may be preferable.” Bilmoria used a dummy variable for women
corporate officers, to examine the relationship between women corporate directors and women corporate officers
noting that a “critical mass of women in the senior management team (25% or more) serves as a measure of whether
women are considered real, not token, contributors to the operations of the top executive team” (Bilimoria, 2006)
Further, Post, Rahman, and Rubow (2011) find that “three women on the board (versus a percentage) seems to be a
critical threshold and at that level there are positive associations with corporate social responsibility” (Post, Rahman,
& Rubow, 2011).
FemaleDir12 is a dummy variable where ‘1’ signifies that female directors comprise at least 25% of the board of
directors and ‘0’ signifies a board with zero female directors. As noted in prior research, utilizing a dummy variable
that captures a critical threshold of female board directors may provide a clearer measure of the impact of board
gender diversity on firm financial outcomes. Using this binary measure of female board presence suggests that the
female directors are not likely to be mere window dressing of the board; rather, using the critical level of at least
25% females on the board increases the likelihood that female directors can make true contributions to board
functioning and influence the board decision making process.
The presence of a critical mass of female directors may enhance their influence on the board’s decision making
process related to financing. Given females’ demonstrated differences in behavior as well as their risk-averse or riskavoidance preference, corporate boards with substantial gender diversity will avoid the risks of debt financing and
pursue alternative sources of funding, relying more heavily on internal sources of funds (retained earnings) or equity
financing (issuance of stock). Consequently, a negative association is expected between FemaleDir12 and corporate
leverage.
Control Variables: Board Characteristics
The board characteristic variables used in this study are traditional measures found in the corporate governance
literature. These characteristics can affect the quality of oversight and the nature of decision-making by board
directors, impacting firm outcomes.
A. Board Size
Board size is a variable associated with the number of links the board has to its environment (Johnson, Schnatterly,
& Hill, 2013). It has been argued that board size can affect the efficiency of board functioning in one of two ways.
One view is that larger firms have larger boards in order to meet the needs of more complex business transactions

and decision making and consequently, board oversight is positively associated with its size (Alves, Couto, &
Francisco, 2014). The alternate argument is larger boards may experience “poorer communication and increased
decision making time associated with larger groups” resulting in a less effective monitoring role (Morales, Ballesta,
& Meca). Underlying this latter assertion is the notion that directors who are more dissimilar could disagree,
creating more board conflict and too much board monitoring, negatively impacting firm financial outcomes. One
study noted that among “companies with a market capitalization of at least $10 billion, typically those with the
smallest boards generated better shareholder returns” (Lublin, 2014).
BDSize12 represents the total number of directors on the board at the fiscal year end 2012. Given the competing
arguments on the impact of board size on corporate governance, no prediction is made as to the relationship between
board size and corporate leverage.
B. Average Board Age
BDAge12 is the average age of the board directors at the fiscal year end 2012, calculated by dividing the sum of all
director ages by the number of directors on the board. This personal characteristic of a board member is a proxy for
experience, reflecting the director’s ability to effectively monitor and advise (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). Further, age
may also be correlated with risk aversion (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). As observed by Ahern and Dittmar
(2012), in Norway, younger boards that resulted from the addition of younger, less experienced female directors was
associated with increased leverage. Given this observation, a negative association between average board age and
corporate leverage is predicted.
C. CEO Duality
An important indicator of CEO power over a board is CEO duality (Baliga & Moyer, 1996), a term used to describe
a combined leadership structure where the same individual holds both the position of board chair and CEO. CEO
duality is typically included in studies examining the effects of corporate governance on firm outcomes, but its
impact has been mixed. Advocates of CEO duality cite the value added as a result of a single, unified leadership
position and note that adequate independent oversight of management can be achieved through other appropriate
board mechanisms, measures and activities. Opponents of CEO duality argue it leads to CEO entrenchment, which
“occurs when managers gain so much power that they are able to use the firm to further their own interests rather
than the interests of shareholders” (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). With less board control over management, CEO
duality can restrict the monitoring role of the board as directors may become more acquiescent.
CDual12 represents whether the CEO of the corporation is also the board chair for the fiscal year end 2012.
CDual12 is a dummy variable where ‘1’ signifies that CEO duality exists and ‘0’ signifies split leadership. With
regard to capital structure, some studies find that firms are more leveraged when managers are more entrenched
while others have found that firms with entrenched CEOs use less leverage and short term debt (Alves, Couto, &
Francisco, 2014). Since prior research results are mixed regarding CEO duality impact on firm performance
measures as well as levels of corporate debt, no prediction is made as to the relationship between CEO duality and
corporate leverage.
Control Variables: Determinants of debt
Consistent with prior research on financing choices and cost of debt financing, the following control variables are
included in the analysis as determinants of a firm’s capital structure and its financing choices.
A. Risk
Firm size has been identified by capital structure literature as one of the determinants of financing mix (Frank &
Goral, 2009). Given its size and tendency to be more diversified, a larger firm is less likely to default on its debt or
be prone to bankruptcy, and thus has lower risk. Consequently, since a larger firm is more likely to rely more on
debt financing than a smaller firm, a positive relationship is expected between firm size and leverage.
Firm size is measured using the log of total revenues for fiscal year end 2012 (LogRev12). Measuring firm size with
the one year lag acknowledges “the spurious relation between size and the debt ratio that arises because of the
relation between size and past profitability (profitable firms become larger) and the short-term relation between
profitability and leverage (profitable firms increase their net worth).” (Titman & Wessels, 1988).

B. Growth
Growth is measured by the percentage increase in total assets (TAGrowth) for the period from fiscal year end 2012
to fiscal year end 2013. Annual percentage growth in the firms’ total assets is an indicator of a firm’s financial
strength and may increase its financing demands. Results are mixed in terms of the relationship between growth and
leverage, with some studies revealing a positive outcome and others a negative association (Alkhatib, 2012).
Consequently, no prediction is made regarding the association between growth and the debt ratio.
C. Profitability
Profitability is measured using Return on Assets for fiscal year end 2012 (ROA12) as reported by Mergent.
Specifically, the ratio reflects the annual net income divided by average total assets for the period. Measuring
profitability in the earlier year (2012) acknowledges the likelihood that profitability has more than just a short-term
immediate effect on the observed leverage ratio (Titman & Wessels, 1988). While firms with higher profits generate
higher retained earnings, reducing their need for debt financing, higher profits can also provide those firms with
greater access to lower cost debt financing, motivating those firms to seek greater leverage. Consequently, no
prediction is made regarding the association between profitability and the debt ratio.
D. Tangibility of assets
The ratio of total property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets at the fiscal year end 2012 (PPEtoTA12) is used
to measure the tangibility of firm assets. Such assets are long-term, substantial investments by the firm, which
generally require significant amounts of financing. Firms with a larger investment in property, plant and equipment
have greater collateral, increasing their ability to issue debt secured by property. Findings by Alves and Ferreira
(2011) suggest a strong, positive relationship is expected between asset tangibility and firm leverage.
E. Non-debt Tax Shield
TaxShield12 represents the ratio of depreciation expense to total property, plant and equipment (net) for the fiscal
year end 2012, and is used to measure the non-debt tax shield. Tax deductions for depreciation are substitutes for the
tax benefits of debt financing (i.e. interest expense deduction), and as such, “firms with large non-debt tax shields
relative to their expected cash flow include less debt in their capital structure.” (Titman & Wessels, 1988) Firms
which have the tax savings benefit of larger tax deductions for depreciation have less motivation to borrow.
Therefore, TaxShield12 is expected to be negatively associated with the debt-to-asset ratio.
F. Industry
Industry is the company’s classification according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), obtained from
Mergent. The five industries referenced in this study are mining (mining and construction), manufacturing,
communication (transportation, communication, and utilities), retail trade (wholesale and retail trade) and services.
Each industry is represented by a dummy variable for that industry and the services industry is withheld from the
model for comparison purposes. It is expected that industry will have a positive relationship with corporate leverage,
since relative to the services industry the other sectors will have different levels of asset investment and will seek a
different optimal balance of debt financing.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Means of the dependent variable and independent variables discussed above are presented for each subgroup in
Tables 4A, 4B and for the total sample in Table 4C.
In this sample, the average debt to asset ratio in 2013 reveals that firms with at least 25% female directors carry an
average debt ratio that is more than 3% lower than firms with no female directors. The debt ratio of firms with
diverse boards and all male boards is 25.01% and 28.24%, respectively. For both diverse and all-male boards, the
minimum debt ratio is zero. The maximum ratio for diverse boards is 61.91% in contrast to a maximum ratio of
81.99% for all male boards. While the average dollar amount of total debt in 2013 for firms with diverse boards is
more than twice that for the all-male boards, in both years the average total assets for diverse boards is more than
three times the average total assets of all-male boards. The percentage of female directors in diverse boards ranges
from 25% to 46.7%, with an average of 31.18% in 2012.

The difference in the financial measures of asset growth and sales are important to note. The average annual growth
rate of total assets for firms with diverse boards is 4.01% as compared to TAGrowth of 12.22% for all-male boards.
Likewise, the average 2012 revenue for firms with diverse boards is more than three times the level for all-male
boards.
Other financial measures are quite similar between the two subgroups in this sample. The average ROA12 is 5.17%
for firms with diverse boards and 5.45% for all-male boards. The average PPEtoTA12 is nearly the same, with
27.70% for firms with diverse boards and 28.17% for all-male boards. Similarly, the average TaxShield12 is nearly
the same, with 3.09% for firms with diverse boards versus 3.18% for all-male boards.
With regard to corporate governance variables, the average BDAge12 for all-male boards is 62.66 years,
approximately one year older than the average age of 61.52 years for diverse boards. Within diverse boards,
however, male directors on average are nearly three years older than female directors; female directors’ average age
is 59.58 versus male directors’ average age of 62.48. Nearly half of all-male boards have CEO duality (11 out of 23
firms) whereas 65% of diverse boards have this leadership structure (36 out of 55). Further, the average board size
of diverse boards is 11.18 members, while the all-male boards have an average of 9.30 directors.
TABLE 4A: ALL MALE BOARDS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable
DebtAsset13%

Mean

Std Dev

28.24

FemaleDir12%

n/a

BdSize12

9.30

MAge12
CDual12%
Rev12 ('000)

21.18
n/a

Minimum
-

Maximum
81.99

n/a

n/a

1.64

6.00

12.00

62.66

5.54

49.40

71.10

48.00

51.08

$9,086,483

$4,582,280

n/a

n/a

$4,850,500

$20,090,724

TAGrowth%
ROA12%

12.22
5.45

21.03
6.01

(12.52)
(5.94)

79.10
19.26

PPEtoTA12%

28.17

22.31

3.63

85.37

TaxShield12%

3.18

2.73

0.55

11.60

TABLE 4B: DIVERSE BOARDS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

DebtAsset13%

25.01

13.77

-

61.91

FemaleDir12%

31.18

6.13

25.00

46.67

BdSize12
BDAge12

11.18

1.81

7.00

17.00

61.52

2.91

51.60

66.90

CDual12%
Rev12 ('000)

65.45
$30,314,024

47.99
$35,399,093

n/a

n/a

$83,680

$152,256,000

TAGrowth%

4.01

13.36

(36.12)

48.76

ROA12%

5.17

6.83

(21.11)

21.08

PPEtoTA12%

27.70

21.84

2.64

82.56

TaxShield12%

3.09

1.86

0.42

11.30

TABLE 4C: TOTAL SAMPLE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable

Mean

DebtAsset13%

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

25.96

16.23

-

81.99

2.45

1.74

-

7.00

BdSize12
BDAge12

10.63

1.95

6.00

17.00

61.85

3.87

49.40

71.10

CDual12%

60.26

49.25

NumFDir12

Rev12 ('000)

$24,054,621

TAGrowth%
ROA12%

6.43

$31,300,192

0%

100%

$83,680

$152,256,000

16.30

(36.12)

79.10

5.25

6.56

(21.11)

21.08

PPEtoTA12%

27.84

21.83

2.64

85.37

TaxShield12%

3.12

2.13

0.42

11.60

Additional sample statistics are provided in Table 5 and Table 7. Table 5 provides the sample means for the
independent and dependent variables by industry sector. Table 7 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for the
variables, revealing no significant correlations among the variables included in this study. See Table 7 in the
appendix.
TABLE 5: SAMPLE MEANS BY INDUSTRY
Mining
Manufacturing Communication
DebtAsset13 (%)
FemaleDir12 (% of firms
within industry)
BDSize12 (count)
BDAge12 (years)
CDual12 (%)
Rev12 (in thousands)
TAGrowth (%)
ROA12 (%)
PPEtoTA12 (%)
TaxShield12 (%)

22.52%
40.00%

24.94%
73.68%

40.60%
60.00%

Retail
Trade
24.65%
75.00%

9.80
66.13
60.00%
$10,356,003
16.54%
3.73%
58.34%
4.31%

11.00
61.66
68.42%
$23,996,792
7.93%
6.91%
20.11%
2.67%

10.60
60.84
50.00%
$18,205,589
4.02%
1.26%
51.24%
3.82%

10.13
62.05
43.75%
$35,711,284
2.00%
4.61%
28.37%
2.99%

Service
18.30%
77.78%
10.44
61.09
66.67%
$17,685,094
5.06%
4.67%
16.62%
2.95%

Regression Results, Analysis and Discussion
The empirical results are summarized in Table 6, providing the coefficients and p-values for the independent
variables for the basic regression (with no interaction terms) and the regression with interaction terms
(FemaleDir12*BDSize12 and FemaleDir12*BDAge). These empirical findings are corrected for heteroscedasticity.
See Table 6 in the Appendix.
The result in the basic regression for the variable FemaleDir12 is consistent with the prediction, and supports
Hypothesis 1. The variable FemaleDir12 reveals a negative and statistically significant coefficient (-6.01, p-value
.08), meaning that boards with at least 25% women directors are associated with a debt to asset ratio that is 6%
lower than boards with no women directors. The corporate governance variables, board size (BDSize12) and board
age (BDAge12) are highly statistically significant. Board size is positively associated with corporate leverage,
although the coefficient (2.1, p-value .03) reflects a relatively small impact. The results estimate that an increase in
the board size by one director is associated with an increase in the debt ratio of 2.1%. In short, larger boards are
associated with slightly higher leverage. Similarly, the coefficient on board age is small, but statistically significant
(-.64, p-value .05). This inverse relationship with corporate leverage suggests that an increase in average board age

by one year is associated with a decrease of less than 1% in the debt to asset ratio. In short, older boards are
associated with marginally lower leverage. The corporate governance variable CEO duality (CDual12) does not
have a statistically significant association with corporate leverage.
TABLE 6: EMPIRICAL RESULTS1

FemaleDir12
BDSize12
BDAge12
CDual12
Log(Rev12)
TAGrowth
ROA12
PPEtoTA12
TaxShield12
Mining
Manufacturing
Communication
RetailTrade
FemaleDir12*BDSize12
FemaleDir12*BDAge12
Adjusted R2
Significance level

Regression with
Interaction Terms2
coefficient
p-value
-98.17 .0224**
3.17 .0681*
-1.35 .0123***
2.06 .5340
-1.71 .0514**
.20 .0084*
-.68 .0006***
.15 .0638*
2.03 .0011***
-3.27 .3506
6.90 .0549**
7.85 .1277
7.48 .1000*
-2.04 .1542
1.82 .0035
.3304
1%***, 5%**, 10%*

Basic Regression
coefficient p-value
-6.01 .0808*
2.10 .0327**
-.64 .0508**
1.97 .5553
-1.73 .0748*
.19 .0082***
-.75 .0004*
.13 .0816*
1.91 .0048***
-4.60 .2856
6.83 .0537**
10.77 .0606*
7.91 .0797*

.2954

While all of the financial control variables are statistically significant, the value of the coefficients suggests a
relatively immaterial impact on corporate leverage. In addition, the signs on the coefficients for both Log(Rev12)
and TaxShield12 are the opposite of the predicted sign. While firm size as measured by Log(Rev12) was expected to
be positively associated with the debt ratio, the results reflect a negative coefficient (-1.73, p-value .07). Thus, while
larger firms that generally bear less risk of default are expected to have a higher debt ratio, these results reflect a
negative association with the debt ratio. However, the small coefficient indicates a relatively immaterial impact on
the relationship. While TaxShield12 was expected to be negatively associated with the debt ratio, the results reflect a
positive coefficient (1.91, p-value .005). Similarly, the small coefficient indicates a relatively immaterial impact on
the debt ratio. Given the lower interest rates in 2012, it may be that firms with higher depreciation expense relative
to total property, plant and equipment still pursued debt financing. The depreciation deduction is not a substitute for
the interest expense deduction, when debt financing can be obtained at a low cost.
There is an observed statistically significant relationship between three industry sectors and the debt ratio. Relative
to the service industry, manufacturing, communication and retail trade all reflect a positive relationship with
corporate leverage. These results clearly indicate there are industry norms for financing that can influence a
particular firm’s leverage.
The regression with interaction terms expands the analysis to consider whether the presence of 25% or more female
directors moderates the association between board size and board age, respectively, and corporate leverage. As with
the basic regression, the result for the regression with interaction terms for the variable FemaleDir12 is consistent
with the prediction, and supports Hypothesis 1. The coefficient (-98.17, p-value .02) indicates that the presence of
25% or more women directors on the board is associated with a lower debt-to-asset ratio. Further, in this regression,
the coefficients on the control variables for board age and board size and the financial determinants of debt reported
1

Both regressions reflect correction for heteroscedasticity.
Interaction terms were tested for joint significance with FemaleDir12; when tested together, both terms are
statistically significant (F value=.064), but when tested one at a time with FemaleDir12, neither term is significant.
2

the same signs as in the basic regression. With the exception of communication, the same industries maintained their
statistical significance.
The coefficients on the interaction terms reflect opposite outcomes from each other. The negative coefficient on the
interaction term FemaleDir12*BDSize12 is not statistically significant (-2.04, p-value .15). Nonetheless, the
direction of the coefficient suggests when boards are larger and there is greater gender diversity on the board, it may
be associated with a lower debt ratio. In contrast, the positive coefficient on the interaction term
FemaleDir12*BDAge12 is statistically significant (1.82, p-value .003). This result reflects that given average board
age, when there is greater gender diversity on the board, it is associated with a higher debt ratio.
Statistical tests were run to test the joint significance of each interaction term individually with the variable
FemaleDir12, using sample mean values for each variable. In both instances, the results proved not to be statistically
significant. However, when both interaction terms are included and tested for their joint significance with the
variable FemaleDir12, using sample mean values for each variable, the results are statistically significant (F-value
.06). Thus, given average board size of 10.63 directors and average board age of 61.85 years, the presence of at least
25% female directors on the board is associated with a debt ratio that is 7.29% lower than the debt ratio for all male
boards. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. The presence of this critical mass of female directors has a moderating
effect on both board size and board age (at their respective means) and further reduces the debt ratio from the
reported 6% in the basic regression.
These results indicate the opposite interaction effect of FemaleDir12 with board size and board age, respectively.
When a board is larger and comprised of at least 25% female directors, it is associated with lower corporate
leverage. The substantial cohort of female directors appears to be influencing board decision making to select lower
levels of debt relative to total assets. This result is consistent with the argument that female directors are bringing
their risk-averse attitude to board discussions, influencing boards to seek a lower level of optimal debt financing. On
the other hand, when a board is on average older in age and comprised of at least 25% female directors, it is
associated with higher corporate leverage. In this circumstance, the substantial cohort of female directors appears to
be impacting board decision making to select greater levels of debt relative to total assets. This outcome is consistent
with the argument that female directors, who may have less experience than male directors, are influencing boards to
seek higher debt financing. In this sample, female directors are on average 3 years younger than male directors.
However, when the two interaction terms are considered together with FemaleDir12, the effect of risk-averse female
directors more than offsets the effect of less experienced, younger female directors, resulting in an increased
negative association between board gender diversity and corporate leverage.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
“Boards around the world are under increasing pressure to choose female directors” (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). The
rationale for inclusion of women on boards is that it can lead to positive outcomes in terms of corporate governance,
which impacts firm performance as well as value to shareholders. Competent women are not substitutes for
traditional corporate directors with identical abilities and talents; rather they have unique characteristics that create
additional value (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010)
The results of this study reveal that when boards have a minimum threshold of gender diversity, defined as 25% or
more female directors, the influence of risk-averse female directors will impact board decisions related to financing,
resulting in lower debt ratios when compared to boards with no female directors. Using this critical mass of women
eliminates from consideration boards with lesser female representation, whose female directors may be marginalized
in their contributions to board functioning and decision-making. Further, the presence of at least 25% women on the
board has a significant moderating effect on the association between both board size and board age, respectively,
and corporate leverage. Overall, the presence of this critical mass of female directors interacts with these two board
characteristics, resulting in an increased negative association, as indicated by the estimated lower debt ratio. The
evidence suggests that substantial board gender diversity is a corporate governance factor that can influence firm
outcomes, and adds insight into the factors that can affect corporate financing choices of US public companies.
Although their numbers have steadily grown, women are an underrepresented group on boards of directors in the
U.S. despite their decades of participation in the workforce. If women are given a greater voice and ability to
contribute at the board level, companies can potentially realize the benefits of their leadership. In short, “gender

diversity on boards may lead to freer expression of ideas, especially when women have power” thereby enhancing
financial policy decision making (Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2013).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study highlights the empirical association between a critical mass of female directors on US public company
boards and corporate leverage. However, it does not suggest a causal relationship. The endogenous nature of
corporate boards limits the interpretation of the results of this research study. Endogeneity concerns arise because of
omitted unobservable firm characteristics (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). It is difficult to determine if firms with lower
leverage are generally larger, and simply attract more female directors (who self-select) to their larger boards or
whether female board members contribute to board monitoring functions and decision making, which leads to lower
levels of debt financing relative to total assets. Clearly, firm attributes are likely to affect both the incentives of
women to join their boards and the incentives of firms to include female directors on their boards.
“Board composition is not exogenously determined but rather is affected by prior decisions and firm characteristics
that in turn affect board decisions. Thus, any observed relationship between board composition and firm outcomes
may in fact be caused by the factors that determined the board composition in the first place” (Johnson, Schnatterly,
& Hill, 2013).
Nonetheless this research reflects the strong negative association that exists between corporate leverage in Fortune
500 companies and a critical mass of female directors on the board. One way in which this study can be enhanced is
to expand the analysis to include firms whose board of directors has at least one female director or a percentage of
female directors below the minimum threshold of 25% used in this paper. With the growing participation of women
on corporate boards, a continuous measure or a step-function of the percentage of female board directors may now
yield more relevant results that were not observed in earlier studies due to the relatively low number of female board
directors. Another way to expand this research is to consider a longer lag period, as a one year lag may not be
sufficient to infer a consistent connection between the critical mass of female directors on corporate boards and a
firm’s debt ratio. Last, given the significant association of industry with the debt ratio observed in this study,
narrowing the focus to a larger sample drawn from a single, specific industry may also yield informative results
about the impact of board gender diversity on corporate leverage.

REFERENCES
(n.d.). Retrieved February 2014, from http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2012-catalyst-census-fortune-500-womenboard-directors.
(n.d.). Retrieved February 2014, from http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2013-catalyst-census-fortune-500-womenboard-directors.
(2013, November 18). Retrieved September 14, 2014, from
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-introduce-legal-quota-for-women-in-boardrooms8947277.html.
(2014, March 25). Retrieved September 14, 2014, from http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2014/03/economist-explains-14.
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance.
Journal of Financial Economics, 94, 291-309.
Ahern, K., & Dittmar, A. (2012). The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female
Board Representation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127, 137-197.
Alkhatib, K. (2012). The Determinants of Leverage of Listed Companies. International Journal of Business and
Social Science, 78-83.

Alves, P., & Ferreira, M. (2011). Capital Structure and law around the world. Journal of Multinational Financial
Management, 119-150.
Alves, P., Couto, E. B., & Francisco, P. M. (2014, January 15). Board of Directors’ Composition and Financing
Choices. Retrieved February 14, 2014, from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379743.
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board Characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the
cost of debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 315-342.
Baliga, B., & Moyer, C. (1996). CEO duality and firm performance: What's the fuss? Strategic Management
Journal, 41-43.
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2001, February). Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock
Investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 261-292.
Bellar, S. L., Helms, M. M., & Arfken, D. E. (2012). The Presence and Absence of Women in Tennessee's
Corporate Board Rooms. Business Perspectives Outlook, 51-57.
Berry, P., & Franks, T. J. (2010, February). Women In The World Of Corporate Business: Looking At The Glass
Ceiling. Contemporary Issues In Education Research, 3(2), 1-9.
Bilimoria, D. (2006, Spring). The Relationship Between Women Corporate Directors and Women Corporate
Officers. Journal of Managerial Issues, XVIII (1), 47-61.
Carter, D. A., D'Souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010). The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards
and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(5),
396-414.
Catalyst. (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2014, from www.catalyst.org.
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998). Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board
Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 269-290.
Deutsch, Y. (2005). The Impact of Board Composition on Firms' Critical Decisions: A Meta-Analytic Review.
Journal of Management, 31(3), 424-444.
Dickins, D. (2010, July/August). CEO and COB duality: Does it matter? Internal Auditing, 25(4), 35.
Frank, M., & Goral, V. (2009). Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are Reliably Important? Financial
Management, 1-37.
Giove, S., Connolly, D. P., & Lilienfeld, D. E. (2011, October 11). Shearman & Sterling's 9th Annual Corporate
Governance Surveys Released. Retrieved March 28, 2012, from Shearman & Sterling:
http://www.shearman.com/shearman--sterlings-9th-annual-corporate-governance-surveys-released-10-11-2011/
Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey
of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review, 9, 7-26.
http://www.2020wob.com/. (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2014, from 20% by 2020 Women on Boards.
Huang, J., & Kisgen, D. J. (2013). Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to
female executives? Journal of Financial Economics, 108, 822-839.

Johnson, S. G., Schnatterly, K., & Hill, A. D. (2013). Board Composition Beyond Independence: Social Capital,
Human Capital, and Demographics. Journal of Management, 232-262.
Lublin, J. S. (2014). Are Smaller Boards Better for Investors? The Wall Street Journal, B7.
Morales, C. L., Ballesta, J. P., & Meca, E. G. (n.d.). Retrieved February 14, 2014, from
http://www.viiaccountingworkshop.upct.es/papers/b8ed26ac43004eceb3b90c0c128b0d8e.pdf.
Myers, S. C. (1984). The Capital Structure Puzzle. Journal of Finance, 575-592.
Nielsen, S., & Huse, M. (2010). The Contribution of Women on Boards of Directors: Going beyond the Surface.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 136-148.
Palvia, A. A., Vahamaa, E., & Vahamaa, S. (n.d.). Are Female CEOs and Chairwomen More Conservative and Risk
Averse? Evidence from the Banking Industry during the Financial Crisis. 25th Australasian Finance and Banking
Conference 2012.
Piot, C., & Missonier-Piera, F. (2014, May 16).
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228618891_Corporate_governance_audit_quality_and_the_cost_of_debt_fi
nancing_of_French_listed_companies. Retrieved June 20, 2014, from www.researchgate.net.
Post, C., Rahman, N., & Rubow, E. (2011). Green Governance: Boards of Directors' Composition and
Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility. Business & Society, 189-223.
Rose, C. (2007). Does female board representation influence firm performance? The Danish evidence. Corporate
Governance, 404-413.
Schooley, D., Renner, C., & Allen, M. (2010). Shareholder proposals, board composition and leadership structure.
Journal of Managerial Issues, 22(2), 152-165.
Simpson, W., Carter, D. A., & D'Souza, F. (2010). What Do We Know About Women on Boards? Journal of
Applied Finance, 27-39.
Stearns, L., & Mizruchi, M. S. (1993). Board Composition and Corporate Financing: The Impact of Financial
Institution Representation on Borrowing. Academy of Management Journal, 603-618.
Talmud, I., & Izraeli, D. N. (1999). The relationship between gender and performance issues of concern to directors:
correlates or institution? Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20, 459-474.
Tanaka, T. (2014). Gender diversity in the boards and the pricing of publicly traded corporate debt: evidence from
Japan. Applied Financial Economics, 247-258.
Terjesen, S., Sealy, R., & Singh, V. (2009). Women Directors on Corporate Boards: A Review and Research
Agenda. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 320-337.
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988, March). The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. The Journal of Finance,
43(1), 1-19.
Triana, M. d., Miller, T. L., & Trzebiatowski, T. M. (2013). The Double-Edged Nature of Board Gender Diversity:
Diversity, Firm Performance, and the Power of Women Directors as Predictors of Strategic Change. Organization
Science.

Wilson, N., & Altanlar, A. (2009, September 22). Director Characteristics, Gender Balance & Insolvency Risk: An
Empirical Study. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1932107 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1932107.
Wilson, T. E. (2010). Females and Financial Experts: Board Diversity in the Era of the SEC's Audit Committee
Requirements. Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 14(4).

Cindy K. Harris, CPA is an Associate Professor of Business and Economics at Ursinus College. She received her
MBA from The Wharton School and her BA in History from the University of Pennsylvania. Her primary teaching
area is accounting, and her research focus is on corporate governance.

APPENDIX
TABLE 7: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (n=78)
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Debt
Asset
13

Femal
eDir
12

BD
Size
12

Cdu
al
12

BD
Age
12

Log
Rev
12

TA
Growt
h

ROA1
2

PPE
toTA
12

Tax
Shiel
d
12

Mining

Manu
factur
-ing

Com
munication

Female
Dir12

-0.091
0.428

BDSize

0.094

0.442

12

0.412

<.0001

Cdual

-0.067

0.164

0.074

12

0.558

0.151

0.519

BDAge

-0.242

-0.136

0.145

12

0.033

0.237

0.017
0.884

LogRev

-0.135

0.296

0.250

0.124

0.108

12

0.238

0.009

0.027

0.281

0.348

TA
Growth

0.151

-0.231

0.096

0.068

0.188

0.042

0.402

0.127
0.268

0.557

0.114
0.322

ROA

-0.306

-0.020

0.172

0.050

0.164

0.040

12

0.006

0.861

0.132

0.661

0.152

0.730

0.054

0.289

-0.010

0.151
0.187

0.077
0.503

0.074

0.051
0.660

-0.020
0.865

0.205
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0.044
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0.001
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0.196
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0.001
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0.291
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0.086
0.452

<.000
1
0.368

0.153
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0.001
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0.248

-0.347

0.433

0.029
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0.255
0.024
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<.000
1
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PPEto
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0.010
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Tax
Shield
12
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0.859
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0.163

Facturi
ng
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0.664

0.348
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0.258
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0.484
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0.006
0.961
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0.039

0.000

0.021
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0.382
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0.229

-0.139
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0.012

0.719
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0.026

Trade
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0.249
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0.915

0.030
0.793

0.133
0.246

0.001

